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ACCESSING JUSTICE THROUGH 
VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE 
KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 
Kate Yesberg* 
This article explores the role of victims in the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) – the forum tasked with bringing leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime to justice. Victims 
have been afforded broad participatory rights at the ECCC, including the opportunity to be joined 
as third parties to the trial. These innovations must be applauded. However, the role victims can 
play in the wider process of national reconciliation remains under-utilised. This article suggests 
that victim participation can be used to increase public accessibility to the trial to ensure 
proceedings occupy a more positive, and prominent space in Cambodia's healing process. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The aftermath of the Khmer Rouge regime is one of history's most tragic displays of post-
conflict impunity. However, three decades on, the Cambodian Government and the international 
community have come together to bring a partial and ironic sort of justice to the Cambodian 
people.1 This paper will explore the role of victims in one of the newest international criminal 
tribunals, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), more commonly known 
as the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (the Tribunal). 
In 2006, Boyle stated that the active participation of Khmer Rouge victims at the ECCC would 
be an essential condition to ensuring impartial and independent trials.2 The following pages provide 
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1  Ironic in that until 1990 the Khmer Rouge were recognised as the legitimate Government of Cambodia by 
the UN; ironic also in that the US dropped 100,000 tons of bombs on Cambodia's Eastern provinces in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, causing extreme numbers civilian deaths and, in effect, creating the Khmer 
Rouge; ironic in that the current Cambodian Government includes many former Khmer Rouge cadre. 
2  David Boyle "The Rights of Victims; Participation, Representation, Protection, Reparation" (2006) 4 JICJ 
307, 310. 
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a short, probing investigation into the current shape of victim participation at the ECCC and how it 
may achieve these objectives. 
Such a discussion is timely. In 2007, the impartiality of the Tribunal came under fire amid 
"serious allegations of mandatory kickbacks by Cambodian staff to government officials in 
exchange for their positions."3 In May 2008, a civil society organisation reported the lack of trust in 
Cambodia's authorities as one of the major constraints to achieving justice at the ECCC.4 The trial 
phase is now underway, with the first of the accused, Duch – commander of the notorious Toul 
Sleng prison – appearing before the Trial Chamber on 30 March 2009. It is now time to revisit 
Boyle's hypothesis and explore the contribution victims can make to increase the integrity of the 
Khmer Rouge trials.  
This article does not attempt to provide substantial comment on the wider issues surrounding 
transparency and impartiality at the trials, but rather adopts a victim-focused lens to look at the 
narrower questions of public access and the dissemination of information to victim communities. 
These issues relate to victims' right to participate in proceedings, and broader reconciliation 
objectives of the ECCC. However, the hope is that this discussion can make an important 
contribution to broader debates about transparency and impartiality. 
Section II of this article canvases the history, structure and jurisdiction of the ECCC. It also 
identifies barriers to comprehensive justice, focusing in particular on the need for greater public 
accessibility to proceedings, and information about the trials. Section III examines the new and 
controversial participation of victims as civil parties before the ECCC. Section IV amalgamates 
these discussions by exploring the potential contribution civil party participation can make to the 
transparency of the Tribunal. It also provides a brief but important caveat on balancing the rights of 
victims and the accused.  
The article concludes that the efforts to afford broad participatory rights to victims must be 
applauded. However, the lack of public accessibility at the ECCC continues to pose a very serious 
threat to its success. Consequently, it is essential that all possible avenues to increase transparency 
are explored. The involvement of civil parties in increasing public access to the trials could be an 
effective tool. 
II THE ECCC: CANVASING ITS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
Thirty years ago the Khmer Rouge regime decimated the Cambodian population while the 
outside world turned a blind eye and attempted to wash its hands of the Vietnam War. During the 
period of Democratic Kampuchea, from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979, an estimated 1.7 million 
  
3  Human Rights Watch, World Report 2008 (Seven Stories Press, 2008) 258.  
4  The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association [ADHOC] (May 2008) EC/ICC Justice 
Project www.bigpond.com.kh/users/adhoc (accessed 20 June 2008) 2. 
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Cambodians died from starvation, disease, and execution.5 The international community, through 
the establishment of the ECCC, is now taking actions to condemn these atrocities. However, the 
ECCC is not a panacea to the immeasurable suffering endured by the Cambodian people three 
decades ago.  
The trial of remaining Khmer Rouge leaders is a long delayed and deeply flawed process. The 
ECCC is part of a weak and corrupt domestic judicial system and will struggle to insulate itself from 
these influences.6 However, millions of dollars are now being poured into the project, and as such it 
is vital that a great effort is made to ensure that the ECCC makes the best possible contribution to 
national reconciliation.  
A Establishing the ECCC 
The ECCC is the product of a bilateral agreement between the United Nations and the Royal 
Government of Cambodia (the Agreement) signed in 2003. In 2004, Cambodia ratified this 
agreement in passing "The Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts 
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea" (the ECCC Law). 
The jurisdiction of the ECCC lies at a unique intersection between international and domestic 
law, an example of a new breed of 'hybrid' or 'internationalised' tribunal.7 The ECCC is part of 
Cambodia's domestic judicial framework. Each Chamber houses both local and international judges, 
with a Cambodian majority in each.8 Decisions must be reached by a super-majority, requiring the 
agreement of at least one international judge.9 All parties to the trial have access to both national 
and international legal representation. 
The ECCC also has subject-matter jurisdiction over both national and international crimes.10 In 
terms of substantive law, the ECCC has the power to try suspects for the domestic crimes of 
  
5  William Shawcross "Cambodia and the perils of humanitarian intervention" (April 2002) Dissent 48. 
6  Human Rights Watch World Report 2008, above n 3. see also Transparency International Global 
Corruption Report 2007 www.transparency.org: According to this report "[j]udicial officers [in Cambodia] 
are among the least trusted government officials, and provincial courts among the least trusted institutions, 
according to a recent opinion survey… political influence affects appointments, case selection and rulings… 
[and] Judicial opinions are not documented transparently, and judges rarely explain their reasoning or note it 
in the court record." 
7  James Cockayne "Hybrids or Mongrels? Internationalized War Crimes Trials as Unsuccessful Degradation 
Ceremonies" (2005) 4 Journal of Human Rights 455, 459. 
8  The Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers have 3 Cambodian judges and 2 international, and the Appeals Chamber 
has 4 Cambodian and 3 international judges. 
9  A decision requires a vote of 4/5 in the Trial Chamber, and a vote of 5/7 in the Appeals Chamber. 
10  Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 2004, art 3-8. 
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homicide, torture and religious persecution. Suspects may also be charged with the international 
crimes of genocide,11 crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,12 
destruction of cultural property during armed conflict,13 and crimes against internationally protected 
persons.14 It is also required to follow Cambodian judicial procedure except where this is silent, 
uncertain or incompatible with international principles. The Court may then refer to the relevant 
international rules.15  
The Tribunal has temporal jurisdiction over the period of Democratic Kampuchea, from 17 
April 1975 to 6 January 1979, and personal jurisdiction over "senior leaders" and "those most 
responsible" for the atrocities committed during that time.16 The Court has to date indicted five 
persons: Guech Eav Kaing (alias Duch), Noun Chea, Ieng Sary, Ieng Thirith and Khieu Samphan.  
It has taken 30 years, but an attempt at bringing justice is finally being made in Cambodia. 
However, does the jurisdiction of the ECCC provide a foundation which can render comprehensive 
justice to victims of the Khmer Rouge? 
B Barriers to Comprehensive Justice 
The limited personal and temporal jurisdictions, although pragmatic, will restrict the Court's 
effectiveness in bringing about comprehensive justice and national reconciliation.17 By 
comprehensive justice I mean the ability of the ECCC to garner a full and accurate picture of the 
Khmer Rouge regime, to hold to account all remaining "senior leaders" and "those most 
responsible" for their crimes, and to contribute to the wider needs of the victim communities.  
The temporal jurisdiction restricts the ambit of the investigations to the official four year reign 
of the regime. However, the Khmer Rouge committed atrocities both before and after the period of 
  
11  As defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9 December 
1948) 78 UNTS 277. 
12  Geneva Conventions (12 August 1949) 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135 and 287. 
13  Pursuant to the Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (14 May 
1954) 249 UNTS 354. 
14  As defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (18 April 1961) 500 UNTS 95. 
15  Boyle, above n 2, 308. 
16  Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea 2004, art 2. 
17  Open Society Justice Initiative, "Recent Developments at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia"(May 2008) Monthly Update on the ECCC, 24. 
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Democratic Kampuchea. These crimes fall outside the jurisdiction of the ECCC and will 
consequently go unpunished.18  
Personal jurisdiction is extended to "senior leaders" and "those most responsible" for the 
atrocities committed by the Khmer Rough. At the time of writing, the Tribunal had indicted only 
five people, which may be perceived as woefully inadequate. Particularly as the five charged 
persons are now elderly people who have been living privileged lives in Cambodia and abroad for 
the intervening years. In December 2008, a disagreement arose between the Cambodian and 
international co-prosecutors over the decision to investigate a further six individuals.19 The 
Cambodian Co-Prosecutor has opposed the move, asserting that the "spirit of the ECCC agreement 
is to focus on only a small group of individuals," that the Tribunal's limited funding does not allow 
the addition of further defendants and raising concerns that "prosecuting perpetrators other than the 
highest leaders could harm Cambodia's stability and national reconciliation."20 The international co-
prosecutor has applied to have the issue resolved by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
While resource constraints will unavoidably limit the ability of the ECCC to try a large number 
of people, the appropriate equation, according to commentator David Scheffer, should be:21  
a reasonable number limited by long-term resource availability and a reasoned application of the 
requirement that defendants be 'senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most 
responsible' for the atrocity crimes of the Pol Pot regime. 
In a recent article in The Economist, Yash Ghai, a former special representative of the UN 
Secretary General to Cambodia, is quoted as stating that if prosecutors have enough evidence to 
prosecute, "they have a duty to do so."22 The decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber in this matter will 
be pivotal in setting the tone of interpretation for the personal jurisdiction of the ECCC, and will no 
doubt be duly critiqued when the time comes.   
The thirty year delay between crime and punishment will also limit the Tribunal's contribution 
to reconciliation.23 The Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot avoided punishment and died a free man in 
  
18  Suzannah Linton "New Approaches to International Justice in Cambodia and East Timor" (2002) 84 IRRC 
93, 119. 
19  See The Court Report: March 2009:  www.eccc.gov.kh (accessed 20 June 2008). 
20  International Centre for Transitional Justice Q&A: First trial by Cambodia's Khmer Rough tribunal (12 
February 2009) www.ictj.org/en/news/features/2291.html (accessed 6 April 2009). 
21  Scheffer, David "How many are too many defendants at the KRT?" The Phnom Penh Post (8 January 2009)  
www.cambodiatribunal.org (accessed 20 June 2008). 
22  "The Court on Trial:Accusations of corruption threaten to discredit the trial of the Khmers Rouges" (2 April 
2009) The Economist www.economist.com. 
23  Christopher Rudolph "Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals" (2001) 55 
Int'l Org 655, 664. 
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1998. The lapse in time will also have had a negative effect on testimonial and forensic evidence.24 
Additionally, the geographical seclusion of the trials will prevent the ECCC from occupying a 
prominent place in Cambodian life. The ECCC is housed in a former military base on the outskirts 
of Phnom Penh,25 making it difficult for most Cambodians to attend public hearings.26 However, 
one of the greatest risks to comprehensive justice at the ECCC is the current lack of transparency in 
proceedings.  
C The Case for Public Accessibility 
In 2007, Transparency International concluded that the judicial system in Cambodia remained 
extremely weak and generally unable to deliver justice to those whose human rights have been 
violated.27 Reports of corruption and the removal or reassignment of cases from trouble-making 
judges are common.28 Despite international involvement in the trials, the ECCC is struggling to 
detach itself from the reputation of the domestic judiciary.  
In the final agreement establishing the ECCC, the UN made considerable concessions to its 
original demands for an international, impartial and independent tribunal. In 2000, Kofi Annan set 
out four principles he deemed necessary for the operation of this tribunal: a judicial bench consisting 
of a majority of international judges, an independent international prosecutor, a commitment from 
the Cambodian government to arrest any person indicted by the tribunal, and an assurance that the 
amnesty granted to Ieng Sary (second-in-command after Pol Pot) in 1996 would not bar his 
prosecution.29 These conditions were rejected by Cambodian Prime Minister, Hun Sen. In February 
2002, the UN pulled out of the negotiation process after concluding that the mixed tribunal as 
envisaged "would not guarantee the independence, objectivity and impartiality that a court 
established with the support of the United Nations must have."30 However, they rejoined and 
concluded negotiations in 2003 despite the Agreement continuing to fall short of Kofi Annan's four 
fundamental principles – the Agreement established a Cambodian, rather than international, 
  
24  See Mohamed Ali Lejmi "Prosecuting Cambodian Genocide: Problems Caused by the Passage of Time 
since the Alleged Commission of Crimes" (2006) 4 JICJ 300. 
25  The ECCC is a 45 minute bus ride from central Phnom Penh. 
26  Patricia M Wald "Iraq, Cambodia, and International Justice" (2006) 21 Am U Int'l L Rev 541, 552. 
27  Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2007 www.transparency.org (accessed 9 February 
2009). 
28  Wald, above n 26, 554. 
29  Shawcross, above n 5, 52. 
30  Shawcross, above n 5, 53. 
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majority on the judicial bench,31 a prosecution team comprised of both local and international 
lawyers, rather than an independent international prosecutor,32 the Cambodian government is now 
hesitant to consent to further arrests, and the amnesty granted to Ieng Sary in 1996 is being used as a 
defence by his lawyers.33 
Consequently, the UN does not have the same degree of control as it has in the ad hoc tribunals, 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR),34 or the hybrid Special Court for Sierra Leone.35 The Cambodian elements of 
the ECCC retain majority control over the judicial bench and the Office of Administration. Serious 
allegations have been made of mandatory kickbacks by Cambodian staff to government officials in 
exchange for their positions.36 In 2007, the United Nations Development Project undertook a 
Special Audit of ECCC procedure. Their report, released in June 2007, criticised the ECCC for 
ineffective monitoring and oversight by the project board, the hiring of local staff who did not meet 
minimum job requirements, and an unjustified excess in staffing level in the budget. The audit team 
was also restricted from accessing the files of twenty eight staff members.37 While the international 
community has on numerous occasions withheld funds pending investigations of corruption 
allegations, the UN does not have the power under the Agreement to commandeer and control the 
process. The challenges of real and perceived malpractice and partiality at the ECCC are seriously 
undermining its integrity and ability to provide comprehensive justice and contribute to national 
reconciliation.   
Of particular importance to victims is the lack of public accessibility to trials and associated 
dissemination of information. At the ECCC, the main barrier to public access is the presumption of 
in camera proceedings which operates at the pre-trial phase. Pursuant to Internal Rules 56 and 77(5) 
  
31  UNGA "Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the 
Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea" 
(22 May 2003) A/RES57/228B, Art 3. [Agreement] 
32  Ibid, Art 6.1. 
33  Ieng Sary's Submissions Pursuant to the Decision on Expedited Request of Co-Lawyers for a Reasonable 
Extension of Time to File Challenges to Jurisdictional Issues (7 April 2008) 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ 
(PTC03) (The Defence for Ieng Sary, ECCC). 
34  The ICTY was established by UNSC Resolution 827 (25 May1993) S/RES/8271990, and the ICTR by 
UNSC Resolution 955 (8 November 2004) S/RES/955/2004. 
35  Cockayne, above n 7, 469; see www.sc-sl.org. Cockayne describes the Special Court for Sierra Leone as an 
ad hoc tribunal dumped in Freetown. The UN has retained almost complete control over the judicial bench, 
with all judges bar three coming from foreign jurisdictions.  
36  Human Rights Watch World Report 2008 above n 3,4.  
37  United Nations Development Programme "Audit of Human Resources Management at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia" (4 June 2007) Report No. RCM0172. 
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of the ECCC, judicial investigations and hearings before the Pre-Trial Chamber are also held in 
camera. In the domestic context, this presumption is justified by factors such as preserving the 
integrity of the criminal investigation, recognising the sensitivities involved in gathering evidence, 
and the safety concerns of potential witnesses. This is standard practice in many inquisitorial 
jurisdictions.38 In ordinary criminal trials these factors may rightly outweigh the public interest in 
open proceedings, particularly in jurisdictions where judicial independence is secure. 
However, the specific context of the ECCC must be taken into account in assessing the 
appropriateness of a presumption of in camera proceedings. First, as discussed above, there is a 
well-documented lack of trust in the judicial process which the ECCC will have to overcome to earn 
the confidence of the Cambodian public. A closed process will be viewed with far greater suspicion, 
making this task incredibly difficult for the Tribunal.39  
Second, the trial of international criminals in a post-conflict context requires far greater 
transparency than an ordinary criminal trial. A primary purpose of such trials is to contribute to 
national reconciliation and collective healing.40 Human Rights Watch has stated that "as with other 
international and hybrid criminal tribunals where widespread public acceptance of the legitimacy of 
verdicts is crucial, the ECCC's over-reliance on closed sessions may do long-term damage to the 
court's broader goals."41 The ECCC should hold meaning for all Khmer Rouge victims. If the 
process is inaccessible to ordinary Cambodians, it will be impossible for the Tribunal to meet the 
needs of victims.  
The Cambodian people cannot be expected to put their trust in a tribunal whose proceedings 
they cannot see. Consequently, the adoption of measures to increase public access may be an 
efficient and effective way to counter suspicions concerning the impartiality and independence of 
the trials. The ECCC has taken this on board to some extent. Article 12(2) of the Agreement 
between the Royal Government of Cambodia and the UN states that public access to proceedings 
should apply at all times, on the basis that it is "not only in the interest of securing a fair and public 
hearing in accordance with international standards to do so, but also for the credibility of the 
procedure."42 Transparency is also enshrined as a fundamental principle of the ECCC in its Internal 
  
38  International Center for Transitional Justice Comments on Draft Internal Rules for the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (17 November 2006) www.dccam.org/Tribunal/Documents (accessed 
20 June 2008). 
39  Ibid, 9. 
40  Agreement, above n 31, Preamble. 
41  Human Rights Watch Comments on Internal Rules (17 November 2006) www.dccam.org/ 
Tribunal/Documents (accessed 9 September 2009). 
42  International Center for Transitional Justice, above n 38.  
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Rules.43 It has been affirmed that if trials are to be a means of achieving reconciliation through 
justice, ordinary citizens must be informed about the judicial process.   
The ECCC outreach programme distributes information booklets, posters, and stickers 
throughout Cambodia. The Tribunal produces a monthly court report which began in May 2008, and 
issues regular press statements. The ECCC also airs radio segments, with themes such as "everyone 
can be involved," "it's time to set the record straight," and "only the senior leaders will be tried."44 
This is particularly important considering the low literacy rate in rural Cambodia.45 
There are also many civil society organisations running parallel community education 
projects.46 NGO efforts include raising awareness and information dissemination, gathering and 
archiving evidence, and assistance with civil party applications and legal representation. 
Proceedings at the ECCC are also gaining significant media coverage, both nationally and 
internationally.47 
Concerns about public accessibility have also been addressed to some extent by the drafters of 
the ECCC Internal Rules. While a presumption of in camera proceedings does apply at the pre-trial 
phase, there are a number of exceptions. Rule 77(6) allows the Pre-Trial Chamber, at the request of 
a judge or party, to open hearings to the public when doing so is in the interests of justice and does 
not affect public order or any protective measure authorised by the court. Rule 56(2) allows the co-
investigating judges, after consultation with the parties, to release information or allow public access 
to their proceedings. Similarly, Rule 54 enables the co-prosecutors to provide the public with an 
objective summary of the information contained in their introductory, supplementary, and final 
submissions, which are otherwise confidential.  It is noteworthy that the co-prosecutors have 
recently issued a public objective summary regarding their final submission in the Duch case.48 
These departures from the in camera presumption are commendable and demonstrate commitment 
to transparent trials.  
However, the language of these exceptions is permissive, not obligatory. The transparency of the 
pre-trial phase is at the discretion of the judges and the prosecution. To date the exceptions to in 
  
43  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Internal Rules (Rev. 1) (12 June 2007), r 21 [Internal 
Rules.] 
44  See www.eccc.gov.kh/english/publications (accessed 15 August 2009).  
45  The adult literacy rate was 69.6% in the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 2004,  
www.statsnis.org/SURVEYS/ (accessed 20 August 2009.) 
46  See www.dccam.org; www.csdcambodia.org; www.bigpond.com.kh/users/adhoc.  
47  See www.cambodiatribunal.com. 
48  Public Information by the Co-Prosecutors Pursuant to Rule 54 Concerning Their Rule 66 Final Submission 
Regarding Kaing Guek Eav alias "Duch" (18 July 2008) 002/14-08-2006/ECCC/OCP (Office of the Co-
Prosecutors, ECCC). 
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camera proceedings have been used sparingly. The Pre-Trial Chamber have conducted parts of the 
hearing of appeals on pre-trial detention orders in public,49 and as stated above, the co-prosecutors 
have released a public objective summary concerning the Duch case. However, civil society in 
Cambodia and abroad has been dissatisfied with the level of public access at the pre-trial phase.50  
Of particular concern is that, due to this in camera presumption and the unwillingness of the 
Court to fully utilise the exceptions, NGOs are struggling to organise close external monitoring of 
ECCC proceedings. The significance of trial monitoring has been stressed by scholars and various 
international criminal tribunals.51 Linton states that close monitoring of the trials is essential to 
achieving reconciliation through justice.52 However, the issue of trial monitoring has not been as 
acute in existing international tribunals. Many of these tribunals adopt common law-based 
procedures where a presumptively public trial phase incorporates the work conducted at the pre-trial 
phase in civil law proceedings.53 However, in recent cases before international jurisdictions, trial 
monitors have also been permitted to remain in court when proceedings have been closed. This was 
the case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone whose Rules of Procedure state that "in the event that 
it is necessary to exclude the public, the Trial Chamber should if appropriate permit representative 
of monitoring agencies to remain."54 Similar provisions have been made at the Special Panels for 
Serious Crimes in Timor Leste.55 Trial monitoring has been recognised as an important means 
through which they can reassure the public that closed sessions are being used appropriately. 
In March 2008, civil society groups in Phnom Penh responded to the lack of transparency at the 
ECCC by issuing the Civil Society Recommendations on Transparency Measures.56 The groups 
affirmed that:57 
  
49  Ruling on the Defence's Request For a Public Hearing on the Appeal Against Provisional Detention Order 
and on the Co-Prosecutors' Request for Redaction of the Defence's Appeal Brief (3 March 2008) 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC-OCIJ(PTC04) (Pre-Trial Chamber, ECCC). 
50  See Civil Society Recommendations on Transparency Measures (March 2008) www.cambodiatribunal.org 
(accessed 3 July 2008); see also Human Rights Watch Comments on Internal Rules above n 41. 
51  See Ralph Henham "Theorising law and legitimacy in international criminal justice" (2007) 3 Int'l J L 
Context 257, 271; Linton, above n 18, 118. 
52  Linton, above n 18, 119. 
53  The ICTY and ICTR were both established quickly along common law procedural lines. However, the ICC 
was the product of international collaboration and as such incorporates both common and civil law 
procedural traits. See Behrens, Hans-Jorg "Investigation, Trial and Appeal in the International Criminal 
Court Statute (Parts V, VI, VIII)" 6 Eur J Crime Crim L & Crim Just 4 (1998) 429-441. 
54  International Center for Transitional Justice, above n 38, 10-11. 
55  International Center for Transitional Justice, above n 38, 10-11. 
56  Civil Society Recommendations on Transparency Measures, above n 50.  
57  Ibid 1.  
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providing information to the people of Cambodia about the work of the ECCC is critical if the court is to 
meet its goal of combating impunity, serving as an example of independent justice, and helping to heal 
wounds of the Khmer Rouge period in Cambodia.  
The recommendations included greater clarity and better communication between the press, the 
principals of the court and members of civil society. They also suggested that a presumption of 
public, rather than private, hearings operate in the Pre-Trial Chamber. The report questioned 
whether the "legitimate purposes of, and need for confidentiality, actually require the high degree of 
secrecy currently imposed by the court on the investigation proceedings."58 Similar concerns were 
raised by NGOs in 2006 in their comments on the Draft Internal Rules. Human Rights Watch then 
stated that "[i]n a civil law system where many key decisions are decided during the pre-trial phase 
it is particularly important that the proceedings be accessible and transparent to the public wherever 
possible."59 
However, there has been no indication from the ECCC of plans to amend the Internal Rules and 
provide for a more open pre-trial phase or allow monitors into closed sessions. Consequently, it is 
necessary to investigate alternative methods for creating a more accessible tribunal. While the civil 
law context has posed a greater challenge to transparency than in existing adversarial tribunals, it 
has also made positive innovations regarding the participation of victims.  The remainder of this 
paper will investigate how these innovations may offset the difficulties posed by in camera 
investigatory proceedings. 
III VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE ECCC 
Victim participation at the ECCC is new, exciting and controversial. In the context of 
international criminal tribunals, the ECCC provides for the most extensive participation of victims 
in its proceedings. As at other international criminal tribunals, victims may lay complaints with the 
Tribunal, be called as witnesses, and seek moral and collective reparations.60 Additionally, victims 
under Cambodian criminal procedure may also be joined as a partie civile or civil parties to the trial 
and enjoy participatory rights akin to those of the accused.  
  
58  Ibid 2.  
59  Human Rights Watch, above n 34. 
60  Internal Rules, rr 52 and 24 respectively; anyone may be called as a witness by the ECCC unless Rule 24(4) 
applies, which exempts any person against whom there is evidence of criminal responsibility. However, 
Rule 28 enables the Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers to provide assurance to potential witnesses 
that the evidence they give will not be used against them in the future.  
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The role of victims has come to the fore over the last ten years. Much has been written on the 
rise of victims at international tribunals but a brief discussion of this development may serve to 
situate victim participation at the ECCC in its wider context.61 
The post-WWII Nuremburg trials were the first international effort to "pierce the sovereign veil" 
and hold individual leaders accountable for crimes against humanity.62 The Nuremburg trials were 
established for the just and prompt trial and punishment of major war criminals and did not address 
the rights of victims or their participation in the trials. In fact, the prosecution at Nuremburg did not 
call any victims of the Nazi regime to testify as witnesses, relying solely on the extensive 
documentary evidence compiled by the regime itself.63 
However, victims' rights were encapsulated shortly after in 1948 by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR), Article 8 of which states that "everyone has the right to an effective 
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by 
the constitution or by law."64 This right is also protected under the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and has been upheld by the UN Human Rights Commission.65 In 1985, the UN 
General Assembly adopted the first significant set of international standards on the rights of crime 
victims in the UN Declaration of Basic Principles for Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power which states that administrative processes should allow "the views and concerns of victims to 
be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings where their personal interests 
are affected."66 
After a long Cold War hiatus, international criminal justice reappeared in the 1990s with the 
formation of two ad hoc tribunals established by UN Security Council Resolutions to try those most 
responsible for crimes committed in the Former Yugoslavia, the ICTY, and the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide, the ICTR.67 At the ICTY and ICTR, prosecutors rely heavily on victim testimony and 
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eyewitness accounts.68 The Statutes and Rules of Evidence and Procedure of each Tribunal provide 
for various forms of victim assistance, protection, and reparation, indicating that victims have 
become a part of the international criminal justice agenda. However, despite this recognition, the 
ICTY and ICTR do not provide for victim participation beyond appearing as witnesses.  
The ad hoc tribunals also suffer from severe budget constraints which limit their ability to fully 
provide for victims. For example, at the ICTY protection is not afforded to witnesses once they have 
finished testifying at the Tribunal and return home.69 This raises serious concerns for the long-term 
safety of the numerous victims involved in the trial. Similar issues exist at the ICTR. Pursuant to 
Rule 69 of the ICTR statute, "the prosecution may keep confidential the identity of victims or 
witnesses who may be at risk of retaliation; however, once under the protection of the tribunal, their 
identities must be disclosed to the defence."70 In 1996, the UN Human Rights Field Operation in 
Rwanda "documented more than sixty-four separate incidents in which genocide survivors and their 
family and friends were killed (227 people) or were injured (56 people) as a consequence of their 
testimony before the tribunal."71 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998, is the first 
international criminal justice mechanism to provide for direct and active participation of victims in 
its proceedings.72 As well as being a milestone in the fight against impunity, the ICC took a major 
step towards the recognition and enhancement of victims' rights. While following a common law 
based procedure, the ICC has been inspired by civil law mechanisms of victim participation. The 
Rome Statute allows victims to present their views and concerns throughout proceedings when their 
personal interests are affected "…in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused to a fair and impartial trial."73 Victims are not full parties to the proceedings, 
but they do have the right to participate, the right to legal representation and may also seek 
reparations. 
A Victims as Civil Parties 
Inquisitorial traditions recognise victims as key stakeholders in the criminal justice process. 
Their procedures allow individuals or groups of victims to be joined as civil parties to the 
proceedings. The role of civil parties is distinct from that of the prosecution, though their functions 
are similar in that both parties are acting on behalf of their wider communities. Prosecutors act on 
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behalf of the State, and civil parties – particularly in the context of war crimes trials – as 
representatives of victim communities. The task of the prosecutors is to secure a guilty verdict 
against the accused, while civil parties in Cambodia are likely motivated by broader goals 
concerning reparation and reconciliation within their communities. Consequently, the contribution 
each party makes to the trial will be different. 
At the ECCC, civil parties must be victims who have personally sustained a real physical, 
material, or psychological injury as a direct consequence of the offence.74 This limits civil party 
applications to direct victims of the Khmer Rouge and their heirs. As full parties to the proceedings, 
civil parties are granted many of the same rights as the accused. Civil parties have the right to be 
represented by a lawyer.75 They may appeal against orders of the Co-Investigating Judges and the 
Trial Chamber, make applications to the Chambers, call witnesses, and make opening and closing 
statements.76 
Internal Rule 23 governs the participation of civil parties. Pursuant to this Rule, the purpose of 
civil party actions before the ECCC is to:77 
(a)  Participate in the proceedings by supporting the prosecution, and  
(b)  seek collective and moral reparations.  
In particular, civil parties can support the truth-finding efforts of the prosecution.78 Every victim 
of the Khmer Rouge holds a piece of the truth about that dark period and their involvement will 
greatly increase the ability of the ECCC to create a comprehensive and accurate picture of the 
period.  However, it must be stressed that civil parties are much more than "evidentiary cannon 
fodder"79 for the prosecution. As independent parties to the proceedings, civil parties control the 
extent and form of the evidence they present.  
Civil parties can also seek collective and moral reparations at the ECCC, which may take the 
form of an order to publish the judgment in any appropriate news or other media at the convicted 
person's expense; an order to fund any non-profit activity or service that is intended for the benefit 
of victims; or other appropriate and comparable forms of reparation.80 Civil parties are not entitled 
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to individual compensation, which indicates the broad motivations behind victim participation at the 
trials. While participation might satisfy personal desires for revenge or retribution, the goals of civil 
party participation are to contribute to communal healing and national reconciliation. 
Concerns have been raised about the effect that too many civil parties may have on the 
efficiency of proceedings.81 Due to the vast numbers of victims (a whole generation and their 
children), there is the potential for many Cambodians to become civil parties. To address the issue 
of efficiency, the Tribunal has focused on organising civil party participation in a way that will 
effectively accommodate a potentially large number of civil parties. Rules 23(8) and (9) provide for 
a form of collective or class action. A group of civil parties may choose to be represented by a single 
lawyer.82 The Co-Investigating Judges or the Chambers may also request that a single lawyer be 
chosen or assigned. This is the approach adopted at the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the 
ECCC, a group of victims may also choose to collectivise their civil party action by becoming 
members of a Victims' Association.83 By joining a Victims' Association, the victim becomes a civil 
party to the trial and will be represented by the Association's lawyer.  
As a general rule under Cambodian criminal procedure, victims' rights are exercised 
individually.84 The departure from this rule and the adoption of flexible standing criteria at the 
ECCC demonstrates an awareness of the unique challenges faced by the trials and is a logical means 
of accommodating large numbers of victims. Collective representation is also beneficial for victims 
as it allows for cost sharing and greater collaboration.  
B Interpreting the Right to Participate 
While civil parties have the right to participate and be heard during the proceedings, views differ 
as to the extent of that participation. This touches upon the much deeper issue of how far the interest 
of a third party should be accommodated at the expense of the rights of the accused.85 This debate is 
currently being played out at the ECCC with regard to pre-trial detention hearings.  
At the hearing on the appeal by Nuon Chea against a provisional detention order, the defence 
objected to the involvement of civil parties at the pre-trial phase.86 The defence asserted that civil 
party participation under Rule 23 presupposed an interest in the outcome of the proceedings, and 
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consequently a restrictive approach to such participation should be adopted. They conceded that a 
civil party was justified in participating when they had an interest in the outcome of the decision. 
However, they argued that civil parties did not have an interest in preliminary decisions, such as pre-
trial detention, and as such should be barred from participating.87 The defence relied on examples 
from the ICC where victims are entitled to participate only when they have a personal interest in the 
outcome of the proceedings.88 However, the status of victims at the ICC differs from that at the 
ECCC. The ICC has granted victims active participation rights, but they are not full parties to the 
proceedings as civil parties are at the ECCC. Consequently, the analogy was probative at best. 
The prosecution argued in favour of civil party participation at the pre-trial phase, submitting 
that Rule 23 did not limit the meaning of "proceedings" and must therefore be interpreted to include 
the pre-trial phase. They also argued that international criminal practice is favourable towards victim 
participation in the investigative phase.89 The civil parties themselves submitted that Rule 23 
conferred on them the right to participate in all stages of the proceedings. They expressed a desire to 
address the court on how the charged person could affect society if he were to be released from pre-
trial detention.90  
The Pre-Trial Chamber accepted the arguments submitted by the prosecution and civil parties 
and rejected the requests of the charged person to exclude civil parties from pre-trial proceedings. 
The Chamber stated that the Internal Rules are "clear in [their] wording that Civil Parties can 
participate in all criminal proceedings…" and that "Civil Parties have active rights to participate 
starting from the investigative stage."91 
This was heralded as a landmark decision by victims' rights activists. The International 
Federation for Human Rights stated that the decision "sets an important precedent in the 
interpretation of the rules applicable to civil party participation before the ECCC."92 Efforts by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber to grant broad participatory rights to civil parties must be applauded. However, 
victim participation before international tribunals remains in its nascent stage. The extent of civil 
party participation continues to be uncertain as the ECCC feels its way forward in this emerging 
area of international criminal law. The fragility of the civil parties' position was demonstrated in 
July 2008 when the Pre-Trial Chamber issued a series of oral judgments prohibiting civil parties 
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from speaking in person during pre-trial appeals. The Pre-Trial Chamber relied on Rule 77(10) 
which they interpreted as prescribing that only lawyers for civil parties, not the civil parties 
themselves, have the right to make brief observations during pre-trial appeals.93 This decision may 
prove to be prohibitively restrictive on civil parties who choose to represent themselves at the 
Tribunal. While the ECCC has incorporated a progressive stance on victim involvement, questions 
remain over how far this participation can extend.  
These tensions are predictable in such a new area of law and should not dampen the real 
innovation of victim participation at the ECCC. No other international criminal tribunal has granted 
victims the right to be joined as full parties to the proceedings. Victims are now seen as an equally 
important stakeholder in the criminal process before international criminal justice. However, despite 
a comprehensive integration of victims into proceedings, the ECCC continues to struggle with a 
negative public perception and inadequate access to proceedings. The following section explores 
how this new form of victim participation may help to mitigate the scepticism fostered by in camera 
pre-trial proceedings. 
IV  MEASURES TO INCREASE PUBLIC ACCESS THROUGH VICTIM 
PARTICIPATION 
Victims of the Khmer Rouge are intimately connected through their communities to the wider 
social goals of the ECCC. Their involvement in proceedings is extensive and an exciting innovation 
in the context of international criminal justice. This paper now explores the ways in which civil 
parties may use their position to increase public access and the dissemination of information at the 
ECCC. It will also provide a brief note on balancing the rights of victims and the accused.  
A The Potential Contribution of Civil Parties 
Civil parties have an important contribution to make to increasing public accessibility to 
proceedings and information at the ECCC which at present is being underutilised. Civil parties have 
existing networks and channels of dissemination which would provide an easy and effective link to 
the Cambodian population. Allowing civil parties the right to disclose information during the pre-
trial phase would bring much needed openness and legitimacy to the ECCC process. 
Civil parties become full parties to the proceedings at the Tribunal. This includes the right to 
access information during the investigation. Internal Rule 86 states that:94  
[a]t all times, the Co-Prosecutors and the lawyers for the other parties shall have the right to examine 
and obtain copies of the case file, under supervision of the Greffier95 of the Chamber, during working 
days and subject to the requirements of the proper functioning of the ECCC.  
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Consequently, civil parties have access to information concerning in camera proceedings before 
the Co-Investigating Judges and the Pre-Trial Chamber which could provide an important avenue 
for increasing transparency and the dissemination of information to the public.    
Pursuant to Internal Rules 56 and 54, the Co-Investigating Judges and the Co-Prosecutors have 
the ability to increase the transparency of the ECCC by disclosing information to the public. This 
paper suggests that the ECCC would greatly benefit from conferring similar rights to civil parties. 
Rule 54 concerning public information by the Co-Prosecutors states that:96  
Mindful of the need to ensure that the public is duly informed of ongoing ECCC proceedings, the Co-
Prosecutors may provide the public with an objective summary of the information contained in [their] 
submissions, taking into account the rights of the defence and the interests of Victims, witnesses and any 
other persons mentioned therein, and the requirements of the investigation. 
Amending the Internal Rules to include a similar provision relating to civil parties has the 
potential to greatly increase transparency at the ECCC. Provided disclosures by civil parties do not 
violate confidentiality or protection orders, such an amendment should not be problematic. It is 
certainly an easier road than attempting to reverse the presumption of in camera pre-trial 
proceedings. It would also put the task of duly informing the public into the hands of parties who 
have a direct interest in conveying information to a wider audience. Presently, this function is being 
performed solely by the Co-Investigating Judges and the Co-Prosecutors whose interests are 
necessarily focused on the process of the trial itself, rather than its broader social impact. 
Institutional differences may lie behind the decision to grant a positive right of disclosure to the 
Co-Investigating Judges and the Co-Prosecutors alone. The Office of the Co-Investigating Judges 
and the Office of the Co-Prosecutors are organs of the ECCC. Their staff are employed by the 
Tribunal. Firstly, this in theory means that all staff have met high minimum standards for 
employment.97 The Tribunal may also control who has access to confidential information within 
these two offices. Secondly, employees can be held directly accountable for misconduct by either 
the UN Staff Regulations and Rules in the case of international personnel, or the appropriate 
national authorities in the case of national staff members.98 However, lawyers for the civil parties 
are not ECCC employees. In the case of misconduct or an abuse of this hypothetical power of 
disclosure, the ECCC would not have the same avenues of recourse available. However, Rule 35(1) 
does provide sanctions for anyone who interferes with the administration of justice through the 
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disclosure of confidential information in violation of an order of the Co-Investigating Judges or the 
Chambers.99 Furthermore, any amendment to the Internal Rules granting civil parties rights to 
disclose information would necessarily contain limitations and sanctions for abuse. Consequently, 
the difference in status between the civil party lawyers and the Co-Investigating Judges and the Co-
Prosecutors should not prohibit the granting of greater disclosure rights to civil parties. 
However, such an amendment may not materialise.. The ECCC has been reluctant to amend its 
Internal Rules based on previous recommendations. With or without an amendment, a general effort 
to focus on increasing dialogue between civil parties and the wider community via civil society 
organisations will help to open the proceedings and encourage public engagement with the ECCC. 
By ensuring that civil parties participate in collaboration with their wider communities, a 
contribution may be made to transparency in the interim within existing boundaries of disclosure, 
for example, through civil parties discussing the non-confidential elements of their participation 
with others.  
Civil society projects such as the public forums held by the Centre for Social Development 
(CSD) are one medium through which the civil party experience may be utilised. CSD have 
conducted a series of public forums throughout Cambodia entitled "Justice and National 
Reconciliation." The main goals of these forums are:100  
(i) to disseminate information regarding the KR years, the ECCC, processes of just peace, healing, 
reconciliation, (ii) to help manage the expectations of the participants as to what the ECCC can achieve 
in terms of peace, justice and reconciliation, and ultimately (iii) to create a multiplier effect in these 
participants as ambassadors to their families and neighbours.  
At present, the forums bring together representatives from the ECCC, civil society 
organisations, and members of local communities. As proceedings continue, civil parties may 
become an important voice at these forums as well. At the time of writing, there were 28 civil 
parties approved by the Victims' Unit at the ECCC, and over 1000 applications waiting to be 
processed.101 As these numbers continue to grow and civil parties begin to actively participate in 
the proceedings, their experience will be a powerful voice.  
 
In their current form, the Internal Rules do not acknowledge the significant interest victim 
participants have in the wider process of national reconciliation. In 1961, Garfinkel argued that the 
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success of a criminal trial should not be determined by the number of guilty verdicts, but instead 
measured by the wider social impact of the process.102 Cockayne agreed, stating that:103  
Verdicts in criminal trials may not reflect the entire social outcome: an acquitted defendant may 
nevertheless walk away socially tainted, just as some defendants may benefit socially from conviction. 
This is undoubtedly true of the ECCC process. The ability of the ECCC to fulfil its wider 
mandate of contributing to national reconciliation will be dependant on broad social acceptance of 
the process. Cambodia already carries a legacy of failed attempts at feigning justice in the aftermath 
of the Khmer Rouge.  
In 1979, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were hastily brought to trial at the People's Revolutionary 
Tribunal established in Phnom Penh by the newly installed, Vietnamese-controlled Government. 
The proceedings are widely regarded as a show trial. The rules governing the court and the law to be 
applied were unclear, and no attempt at impartiality or fairness was made. The defence lawyer for 
the two accused called her clients "criminally insane monsters" and demanded that they be 
condemned to death.104 The Court sentenced Pol Pot and Ieng Sary to death in abstensia. However, 
neither accused was ever brought to justice. Pol Pot died in his bed on the Thai border in 1999, and 
Ieng Sary was a free man until his indictment by the ECCC on 12 November 2007. To add insult to 
injury, Ieng Sary is now attempting to use the 1979 show trial and the principle of double jeopardy 
to avoid prosecution at the ECCC, claiming that he has already been tried and punished for the 
crimes he committed.105 The severe lack of transparency, legitimacy, or concern for due process has 
tainted the legacy of the People's Revolutionary Tribunal. The aftermath demonstrates that a guilty 
verdict alone will not secure public acceptance or satisfy the need for justice in Cambodia.  
Again in 1996, Ieng Sary was officially pardoned for his crimes by Prime Minister Hun Sen. At 
the time he was a war-lord controlling the gem mines on the Thai-Cambodian border and still 
connected with the remaining faction of the Khmer Rouge led by Pol Pot.106 Shortly after in 1998, 
the Government also granted amnesties to Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan. At a press conference 
honouring the occasion, the two men issued a brief and ambiguous apology for their sins.107 In the 
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wake of Ieng Sary's 1996 pardon, he confided in a French television show: "Honestly, in my heart 
the wound is healed."108 It is obvious the victims of the Khmer Rouge have not derived the same 
level of satisfaction from the de facto justice employed by the Cambodian government.109 To 
ensure the ECCC does not meet the same fate, its proceedings must be perceived as impartial, 
independent, and focused on the broader goals of social healing and upholding the rights of victims. 
Submitting the five accused to the full and proper weight of the law, which includes guaranteeing 
due process rights, is also an essential condition for legitimate trials. 
 
B Balancing the Rights of Victims and the Accused 
In both civil and common law, and indeed in international criminal justice, confusion prevails 
about rights protection: "where do the victim and the accused person stand relative to each other and 
the interests of the State?"110 In the context of the Khmer Rouge regime and such egregious crimes, 
the kind of violence Kant called "radical evil", Hannah Arendt has asked:111 
What does "justice" mean, in the face of so much horror? ... Should we begin with the presumption of 
innocence or the assumption of guilt? Are there such things as unforgivable crimes? 
Indeed, these sentiments have recently been expressed at public hearings before the Pre-Trial 
Chamber at the ECCC. At the appeal of a pre-trial detention order, Duch's lawyer submitted that his 
client's human rights had been violated because of the time he had spent at a military jail before 
being transferred to the ECCC detention facility.112 This argument was met with a wave of laughter 
from the Cambodians in the public gallery. It was overwhelmingly comical that this man, who 
directed the S21 prison which oversaw the deaths of tens of thousands of people, would claim that 
his human rights had been violated.113 It was a moment which has been described as one of perfect 
irony which "captured every aspect of the horror, hope, scepticism and disbelief" surrounding this 
concept of justice.114 
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However, commentators at the ECCC have begun to stress the importance of fundamental due 
process rights, such as the presumption of innocence, in the face of increasing victim involvement. 
Victor Koppe, a defence attorney for one of the Khmer Rouge leaders has stated that "[t]he question 
is whether or not everything in this tribunal is institutionalised in such a way that only guilty 
verdicts can come."115 Although the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge period are difficult to 
comprehend, and while an enormous gap remains between "what actually happened in the 1970s 
and how precisely these events can be 'objectively' reconstructed"116 in a criminal trial, this 
question remains valid and vital. The ECCC has broader goals than delivering verdicts. In addition 
to national reconciliation, the ECCC will also serve as an exemplary institution, demonstrating the 
application of the rule of law and developing the capacity of the domestic judiciary.117 Victims' 
rights have taken centre stage in recent years, but must not be entertained at the expense of 
fundamental due process rights of the accused. However, as domestic and international 
developments show, the two are not mutually exclusive. 
Victim participation in criminal proceedings is a settled principle in many domestic civil law 
jurisdictions. In Germany, for example, victims may act as subsidiary prosecutors with rights to 
legal representation and active participation throughout the process.118 The partie civile or civil 
party model operates in both France and Belgium.119 However, the ECCC is the first forum to apply 
this model in an international criminal law context. Consequently, the traditional justifications and 
limitations of victim participation in domestic jurisdictions cannot be directly applied to the ECCC. 
In the trial of serious international crimes, the stakes are much higher than in ordinary criminal 
cases. It is important to contextually reassess where the victim and the accused stand relative to each 
other, the interests of the public, and the power of the State.120 
This concept is encapsulated in the principle of equality of arms which requires that no 
substantial disadvantage exist between one party and another when presenting his or her case in 
court.121 Critics of civil party involvement have argued that active victim participation upsets the 
delicate balance between the power of the State and the rights of the accused. Such criticisms are 
usually reasoned from common law principles based on a bipartisan adversarial trial.122 Common 
  
115  Seth Mydans "Tribunal in Cambodia gives Victims a Voice" (17 June 2008) The Global Edition of the New 
York Times 10. 
116  Chandler, above n 104, 68. 
117  Civil Society Recommendations on Transparency Measures, above n 50, 1.  
118  Doak, above n 61, 308. 
119  Doak, above n 61, 310. 
120  Findlay, above n 110, 50. 
121  Findlay, above n110, 48. 
122  ADHOC, above n 4, 38. 
 
 ACCESSING JUSTICE THROUGH VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL 577 
law criminal procedure, in its purest form, is a type of public law, punishing crimes which are 
serious enough to impact upon the wider social good and stripping those offences of their 
interpersonal character.123  
This is not the occasion to delve into a comparison of the tensions between common law and 
civil law criminal procedure. Suffice it to note that an inquisitorial process escapes many of the 
difficulties of a common law trial in terms of victim participation by virtue of the fact the 
proceedings are judge-led, rather than party-led. Civil law criminal procedure is a unitary process 
where public and private elements of an offence are pursued simultaneously under far more judicial 
mediation than in the common law system.124  
Concerns raised by common law jurist should not, however, be dispensed with on the basis of 
these tensions alone, particularly in the case of the ECCC. International criminal justice has 
developed primarily in common law-dominated forums and invariably, the current form of 
international criminal procedure will reflect this. International procedure is supplementary to 
Cambodian criminal procedure at the ECCC, but will trump domestic law in the case of an 
inconsistency between the two.125 Indeed, adversarial proceedings have already been enshrined as a 
fundamental principle of its operation.126 
However, in terms of an approach to victim participation, it is unlikely that Cambodia's civil law 
system will come into conflict with international rules given recent developments in the field of 
international criminal law. The recognition of active participatory rights for victims at the ICC 
demonstrates that the involvement of civil parties at the ECCC is congruent with the current state of 
international criminal law. Perhaps more telling is the development of international criminal justice 
in the common law based ICTY and ICTR which also indicated that active victim participation can 
function alongside fundamental due process rights of the accused, even in adversarial proceedings.  
Exploring efforts to increase public access to proceedings at the ECCC need not benefit victims 
alone. The European Court of Human Rights held that the public character of proceedings "protects 
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[all] litigants against the administration of justice in secret with no public scrutiny."127 The UNDHR 
also secures the Accused's right to transparent proceedings. Article 11 states that:128  
[e]veryone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence. 
Greater public access at the ECCC will benefit all parties, as well as the wider community. It 
will assist in facilitating external monitoring of proceedings and ensure the process is open to 
objective comment and critique. In so doing, transparency measures will contribute to creating an 
impartial and independent tribunal where the rights of all parties are upheld. 
The disclosure of information must be fair and comprehensive. If empowered to do so, civil 
parties will naturally disseminate information relevant to national reconciliation and victims rights. 
However, disclosing information regarding the rights of the accused is also essential in creating true 
transparency and facilitating accurate monitoring of proceedings. Consequently, efforts to increase 
transparency through victim participation must be sought alongside continued pressure to open 
proceedings to the public. It may also be beneficial to afford disclosure rights to the Co-Defence 
Lawyers as well.  
V CONCLUSION 
The impartiality of the ECCC has come under fire in the past few years. The instability of the 
domestic judicial system and allegations of corrupt practices have severely tainted the integrity of 
the Tribunal. The civil law foundation of the ECCC has also created unique challenges by importing 
a presumption of in camera pre-trial proceedings. Exceptions to this presumption have not been 
utilised adequately and for this reason, there is a lack of access to proceedings before the Tribunal, 
and insufficient information disseminated to the public.  
While it is easy to become cynical or despondent about the process, this attempt at long-awaited 
justice needs support and constructive criticism. It is important that the positive innovations at the 
ECCC be acknowledged and developed. While addressing the shortfalls of the ECCC as it stands, 
this paper also offers suggestions as to how victim participation may combat the most difficult 
challenge facing the Tribunal.  
The Internal Rules of the ECCC have paid respect to Cambodian procedure by allowing the full 
participation of victims as civil parties. They have also made "intelligent reference" to alternative 
procedures to facilitate the effective participation of a large number of victims, such as allowing 
collective representation.129 The participatory rights of civil parties have also been interpreted 
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broadly by the Pre-Trial Chamber, although these rights remain fragile. This demonstrates a 
commitment from the Chambers to encouraging the participation of victims and recognising the 
important contribution they will make to the success of the Tribunal.  
However, the ECCC has not recognised or utilised the connection between victims and the 
broader goal of national reconciliation. The Internal Rules allow victims to support the prosecution 
and seek reparations, but not to engage with the wider community. The ECCC has recognised the 
importance of creating a transparent and accountable process. It has established links between the 
Tribunal, victim communities, and the general public through granting disclosure rights to the Co-
Investigating Judges and Co-Prosecutor. It also operates an out-reach programme and consults with 
civil society organisations. However, civil parties have not been included in this process.  
Existing international criminal tribunals have also shied away from institutionalising the 
connection between victims and national reconciliation. Most have not even recognised victims 
beyond their capacity as witnesses. However, common law procedure allows for far greater public 
access to proceedings, and consequently the need for creative transparency measures has not been at 
issue. At the ECCC, transparency is a very real challenge. It is one of the first times international 
criminal justice has been applied in a domestic civil law context. Consequently, it requires more 
than a simple importation of existing rules. This paper suggests that the answer may lie in the civil 
law context itself. Victim participation is still in its nascent stage on the international scene. 
However, Cambodia has the advantage of settled principles of civil party involvement drawn from 
the French model.  
Civil parties have access to outside support and a wide community network. They also have the 
personal motivation to contribute to the process of social healing in Cambodia. By granting civil 
parties the right to disseminate information, the ECCC is putting the task of increasing public access 
into the hands of parties who have a real interest in doing so. The involvement of victims in this way 
can strengthen the perception of impartiality and independence at the ECCC. 
 
 
